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ABSTRACT
Thispaper presents certain remarkably simple results concerning mar—
ket's allocation to R+D and its comparison to socially efficient alloca-
tions. ic posit that a firm can undertake more than one project aimed at
the same innovation, and consider a product market characterized by
Bertrand competition. Among the results 'we obtain is that the market k+D
(that is, the number of projects undertaken, and the effort spent on dif-
ferent projects) is invariant to the number of firms. We also examine the
effects of the number of firms on the gains from innovation to consumers,
firms, and society, and show, in particular, that the market undertakes
less R+D than is socially desirable.
RaajKiir.r Sah JosephE. Stiglitz
Depar±rrentofEconomics Departrrent ofEconomics
28Hilihouse Road Dickinson Hall
Yale University Princeton University
New Haven, CT 06520 Princeton, NJ 08544TBE INVARIANCE OF R+D TO TUE NUMBEROFFIRMS IN ThE INDUSTRY
RaajKumarSahand Joseph E. Stiglitz*
1. Introduction
A major concern of the recent research in the theory of innovation has
been the effect of market structure on private marginal returns from inno-
vation, and, thus, on the equilibrium level of market R+D. Recent work
has also emphasized the relationship between marginal private returns and
social returns which, in general, may not be the same.1 For instance,
in some patent races, the private return is either zero, when the firm is
not first to invent, or the total (appropriable) return when it is;
while the social return is the increase in the present value of social
gain from having the invention earlier than it otherwise would have been
available.
The present analysis is based on a model in which a firm can undertake
more than one project aimed at the same innovation, and the product market
Is characterized by Bertrand competition. The main results of this paper
are
(i) The number of firms in the induty has no effect on the pace of
innovation. That is, the marginal decisions of a firm to undertake an
additional research project, or to spend additional efforts on a project,
are unaffected by the number of firms. The resulting invariance of the
market equilibrium is in marked contrast with some previous studies2
which have found the number of firms in the industry to be a critical
determinant of the market R+D.
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(jj)Any'interior' market equilibrium is 'quasi—efficient.'3 That
is, the set of projects undertaken in the market as well as the intensi-
ties with which they are undertaken maximize the economy—wide probability
of a successful innovation, given the level of expenditure on R+D, but the
market expenditure on R+D is smaller than what is socially optimal.
These results are fairly general; they hold, for instance, whether
R+D projects have independent outcomes or not, whether there is symmetric
equilibrium or not. In a more restricted model we also establish that:
(iii) The intensity at which a research project is pursued .n the
market is invariant to the magnitude of (appropriable) rent from
ful innovation. If the rent is larger, then the number of urojects
undertaken is larger.
(iv) The intensity at which a project is undertaken in the market is
socially optimal but, in general, the market undertakes fewer projects
than is socially desirable.
Cv) The number of firms in the industry affects the gains from
innovation to firms and consumers and, thus, it affects aggregate social
gains. A larger number of firms lowers industry profit as well as the
profit of an individual firm1 Also, for a class of innovations, a larger
number of firms raises consumers' gains as well as the aggregate social
Lains from innovation.
A key feature of our model is that a firm may undertake more than one
research project aimed at the same innovation, if it is profitable to do
so. This assumption, we believe, is more plausible from an economic view-
point than the one underlying some previous models in which a firm can
undertake only one research project. It is easy to understand why this
difference in assumption has a significant effect on the analysis of R+D.3
Underour assumption, a firm has a larger set of instruments (it can
select a portfolio consisting of projects at different levels of inten-
sity) and thus, in general, its behavior is quite different from that when
it is arbitrarily constrained to undertake a single project. The proper-
ties of the resulting market equilibrium in research are also, therefore,
different. This insight has critical implications for the analysis of
k+D, regardless of the particular model one uses (for example, the partic-
ular assumptions one makes concerning the nature of competition in the
product market); though the specific consequences of our assumption
would, of course, depend on the characteristics of the model. The present
analysis is conducted in a context where there is Bertrand competition in
th. product market. We begin, in the next section, with a simple model;
a more general model is investigated in Section 3.
3. A Simple Model
A research project has a binary outcome: it is either successful or
not,4 If e is the variable effort (expenditure)on a research
project, then the probability of its success is p(o) •wheree .￿.0
1 2p0 ,andp > 0 .Theoutcomes of different projects are in-
dependent of one another, regardless of firm affiliation. A firm can
undertake as many projects as it desires, all of which are aimed at the
same innovation. Thus, if eudenotes the effort by the i—th firm on
its project j ,andif this firm undertakes j =1....,kprojects,
then the probability that at least one of the projects undertaken by this
firm is successful is given by l —iT (1—
P(eij))
• jai
Theproduct market is characterized by Bertrand competition.4
Specifically, the (positive) rent gained by a firm is R if it innovates
and if no other firm innovates. If two or more firms inno'vate, then none
of them get any rent and the benefits of innovation accrue solely to con—
sumers, hi denotes the probability that all firms, other than the ith
kf
firm are unsuccessful. That is, h =TT 11(1—
P(Of
)), where
f =1,..,,Ndenotes the firms, N ￿.1,andit is finite. Then, the




is the fixed cost of undertaking a project.
le focus at present on the symmetric interior Nash equilibrium in
which all projects have the same p(e) function, each firm undertakes the
same number of projects and, further, if a firm undertakes more than one
project, then all projects are undertaken at the same level of effort.6
At an interior equilibrium, e > 0 ,k￿1,andboth e and k are
finite, Therefore
k
(1) q 1 —(1—p(e)) and
Nk—k
(2) h(1W— p(e))
The first order conditions with respect to e and k,fora firm's
optimum,are:Rhq —k=0,andRhq —(e+a)=0•respectively.
These equilibrium conditions can be restated, using (1) and (2),
(3) R(1_p)•••'Pe_1=Oi and
(4) —R(1 —)n1(1—p)—(e+a)=0,5
where n =Nkis the total number of projects undertaken in the market.
Note that the above expressions determine the effort per project, e,
andthe total number, n ,ofprojects undertaken in the market. A
change in N simply changes k ,keepingn and e unchanged. Thus,
the only effect of N is on the number of projects a firm undertakes,
which is k =n/N•Ina duopoly, for instance, each of two firms under-
takes half as many projects as a monopoly would have undertaken, it
follows then that the number of firms in the market has no impact on (i)
the total number of research projects undertaken; (ii) the intensity of
each of the projects; and, therefore (iii) the probability of a success-
ful innovation.
The intuitive idea behind this result is as follows, Consider the
marginal decision of a firmtoundertake the last project (or to invest
the last dollar on a project). This project (or dollar) yields a benefit
only if the other projects undertaken by this firmfail, wellifall
of the projects undertaken by other firms fail,, The marginal decisions
are thus influenced by the total number of projects undertaken in the
market; and not by how these projects are partitioned between the firm
makingthe decision and other firms, Thus, whether the marginal project
yields a return, as well as the return from the marginal effort invested
in a project are independent of the number of firms. Furthermore, it is
easily verified that this independence holds even when a firmhasa vector
of control variables, and when the expected cost of a project is a
general function of the control variables.
A-still stronger result is obtained by solving (4) for (1 —p)fl and
substituting the resulting expression into (3). Thisyields
(5) —(e +a)pI(l—p)ln(l—p)—1 06
The above expression characterizes the optimal e ,andit does not con-
tain U or N •Thus,the optimal effort per project is independent not
only of the number of firms in the industry, but also of the magnitude of
rent from successful innovation. Further, by perturbing (3) with respect
to U ,andnoting that e is invariant to this perturbation, we obtain
(6) dn/dR =—l/Rln(l—p)> 0
Thus, a larger number of projects is undertaken in the market if the rent
from innovation is larger.
The above analysis also brings out clearly the difference between the
•consequences of our assumption that k is determined endogenously, and
the more restrictive assumption under which k is exogenously fixed at
unity. In the latter case, it is apparent from (3) that the optimal
effort per project (nd hence the probability of a successful innovation
in the market) depends, in general, on the number of firms.
Welfare Analysis: The invariance results we have derived might give
• an impression that public policy (affecting the number of firms in the
industry) has no role to play in the context of research and innovation.
This is not correct because, though the number of firms does not affect
the aggregate probability of innovation, it does affect the division of
this probability between the two cases: (i) when only one firm innovates,
and (ii) when more than one firm innovates. Since the post—innovation
gains to consumers (or firms) are different under these two cases, their
expected gains are affected by the number of firms in the industry.
To see this, let z denote the probability of innovation, and let g
denote the probability that two or more firms innovate. That is7
(7)
(8) gz—Nhq
where,recalling our earlier notation, Nhqisthe probability that only
onefirm innovates.Clearly, z is independent of N but its division
8 between g and Nhqisnot. Specifically
(9) d(Nhq)/dN= h[kln(l—p)+cj]<0
This is what we would expect, because if- the same numberoftotal projects
is divided among a larger number of firms then the probability that two or
sore firms innovate is higher and, correspondingly, the probability that
only one firminnovatesis lower.
The above reasoning also suggests that a larger numberoffirms would
lower the aggregate profit of firms. This can be ascertained as follows.
Theaggregate corporate profit is given by
(10) Nn=RNhq—Nk(e+a)
Now, note thatthe last term in the above right hand side doesnot depend
on N •whereas,from (9),thefirst term is decreasingin N .Thus,
d(Nn)/dN < 0 •Further,dnfdN =[d(Nn)/dN—t]/N<0 ,ifafirm's pro—
fitis nonnegative (which we assume).Therefore,a larger number of firms
lowersthe profit for a single firm,aswell as for the industry as a
whole.
Next, consider consumers. They face a monopoly on the fruits of inno-
vation if only one firminnovates,but get the entire-benefit from innova-
tion if two or more firms innovate. If their gains inthesetwo oases are
represented by S1 and S2 respectively, then S2 —
S1
-representsthe8
loss due j. monopoly, relative to the casó 'when consumers receive the full
benefit of innovation. Normally, S2 —s1willbe positive.9 Now, the




,whichcan be restated as
(11) S32z — — S1)Nhq
where the first term represents the full gain from innovation, and the
second term represents the loss due to monopoly. Using (9), it is obvious
that the consumers gain is larger if the number of firms is larger.
Since the number of firms has opposite effects on consumers and firms,
wecombinethese two effects to study the societal implications. Our
analysishere assigns equal 'weights to the gains of consumers and firms,
but the results can be easily rephrased if the 'weights are different. The
social gain is B =S+Nn,which,from (10) and (11), can be expressed
as
(12) BS2z—(S2—S1—R)Nhq—Nk(e+a)
It is apparent from (9) and (12) that whether the social gain is increas-
ing or decreasing in the number of firms depends on 'whether the consumers
lossdueto monopoly, (S2 —S1)
,islarger or smaller than the firms'
rent from monopoly, R •Intypical oases in 'which the innovation is
meant to reduce a product's production cost, consumers suffer deadweight
losses when a monopoly captures any rents; that is, S2 — >R In.
these cases, clearly, a larger number of firms yields a larger social
jsin.
The last result also suggests that if the government canalterthe
number of firms in a non—distortive manner(forinstance through anentry9
subsidy) and if there are no fixed costs associated with establishinga
firm, then the optimal number of firms is such that each firm undertakesa
single project. Obviously, if there are fixed costs, we can use (12) to
calculate the corresponding optimal number of firms11
Social Optimum: Our objective here is to contrast thesocially opti-
mal resource allocation to R+D with the market allocation described
above. Let n denote the number of projects undertaken by theplanner.
Then a ,givenin (7), is the probability that at least one project is
successful; in which case consumers receive the full benefits of
innovation. The expected social gain is:S2z —rt(e + a)•12 The
corresponding first order conditions, with respect to e and n,char—
acterizing the internal optimum, can be expressed as
(13) S2(1 —p)fh—1=
(14) —S2(1 —p)fl1(1—p)—(a+a)0
Note the similarity between the social allocation describedabove, and the
market equilibrium described by (3) and (4). The two sets ofexpressions
are identical except that the gain from successful innovation is R fora
firm, whereas it is S2 for the planner. This similarity should not be
surprising because, once again. the marginal decision of the planner (to
undertake the last project, or to invest the last dollar on aproject) de-
pends on the total number of projects that have already been undertaken;
just the way U did for a firm in the market. Now, recall that
do/dR 0 •Itfollows that the market effort per project is at the
socially efficient level,
Further, recalling (6), the similarity between the market equilibrium10
and the social optimum also implies that whether the number of projects
undertaken in the iarket is smaller (larger) than the socially optimal
number depends on whether S2 is larger (smaller) than K •Onceagain,
in a wide variety of circumstances (for instance, for innovations dealing
with cost reduction), the full consumers' gain from innovation is larger
than the rents to a firm from monopolizing the innovation; that is,
S2 > K •Inthese cases (on which we focus in the rest of this paper),
the market undertakes fewer projects than is socially desirable.
In fact, the economic content of the above result is a consequence of
Bertrand competition, and it does not depend on some of the details of the
model (for example, whet1er a firm can undertake many or only one pro-
ject). The reason is simple. Under Bertrand competition, a firm captures
rents only when it turns out to have monopoly over innovation. It follows
that, so long as the rents to a firm when it is a monopoly are smaller
than the full consumers' gain from innovation, the market investment in
RID is smaller than what is socially desirable.
3. General Invariance Results
The model in the preceding section assumed that there is a single
technology for innovation (though the effort level could vary) and that
the outcomes of different projects are statistically independent; also,
we focussed on a symmetric equilibrium. In fact, our central result that
the market's allocation to R+D is invariant to the number of firms is more
general. The main reason behind this invariance is that, under Bertrand
competition, there ii return from undertaking the marginal project only if
all other projects are unsuccessful; regardless of (i) how these pro—11
jects are partitioned among firms, (ii) whether these projects are based
on the same or different technologies and effort levels, or (iii) whether
the outcomes of these projects are correlated or independent. Moreover,
the return from the marginal project (when it is the only successful
project), R ,isalso independent of what the portfolio of unsuccessful
projects is. In the following paragraphs, we make this intuition more
precise.
Lett=1,•.., T denote different typesofprojects, where
is the effort corresponding to a project of type t, and where different
types of projects represent different technologies as well as different
levels of effort spent on any particular technology. The vector
.1 T t MEM , ..., M Idenotesa portfolio of projects where Mis the
t number of projects of type t • M 0 • Define r(M) to be the proba-
bility that at least one project in the set M is successful.
-Now, consider the portfolio which maximizes —Rr(M) —M, where
A 1 T • [e ,..., e].We refer to this portfolio as the 'quasi—efficient
portfolio.' Let M_t = (M1,.S.,Mt—1,...,.Mr], and r(M) =
rOt) —r(M)
.r(M_t) is thus the probability that the marginal pro-
ject of type t is successful and all other projects in the portfolio
are unsuccessful. (Note that the last deduction does not depend on
whether the outcomes of projects in the portfolio -M are statistically
correlated or independent.) Analogously, define
—EM1,...,M3 +1,....MT]
M_t+j
(M1,..., Mt —1,...,M +1,
MT],
r3(M)r(M÷) —r(M), and rj(M_) = r(M_t+j) —r(M_t)





forall t for which Mt 1,andfor all j .Theabove expressions
have obvious meanings. Expression (15) implies that all marginal projects
that are undertaken at least breakeven. Expression (16) implies that it
does not pay to undertake a project not already undertaken. Expression
(17) ensures that each marginal project undertaken maximizes the more—
mental profit. In the analysis below we assume for brevity that there is
a unique quasi—efficient portfolio but, as we shall see, our qualitative
conclusions are not affected by this assumption.
It is straightforward to establish that: The quasi—efficient port-
folio is identical to the portfolio of a social planner who is constrained
to spend no more than what is spent on the quasi—efficient portfolio. To
see this, let M denote the quasi—efficient portfolio; the correspond-
ing total effort is M* .Clearly,for this level of effort, r(M*) is
the maximum probability of at least one successful project. Therefore, a
social planner, attempting to maximize S2r(M) ,butconstrained to
spend no more than ,cando no better than to choose the portfolio
•(This result explains why we have referred to M as the quasi—
efficient allocation.) Further, the optimal expenditure of a social
planner would exceed if he did not face any constraint on spend-
ing; this is because the social gain from a successful project,
exceeds R .Thus,the expenditure on the quasi—efficient portfolio is
smaller than what is socially optimal.
-
Next,consider market allocations, [m19..., mJ denotes a
—f —f 1 —fT
portfolio of firmf,andm [m...., m]denotesthe constraints13
on the number of projects of different types that a firm can undertake'3
That is, ft 2ft or, equivalently, mf .Thecorresponding mar-
ket portfolio, and the constraint on the market portfolio,respectively,
are in5, andin= 5 . 5mrepresents the probability
fi
that at least one of the projects within the set mi is successful, and
allprojects in the set 5 are unsuccessful. Therefore, the profit
fi
of firm i can be expressed a: Rs(m, 3m)—m•Ourinteresthere
fi
is to examine the market portfolios resulting from firms' choices in the
context of Nash equilibria.
Suppose that, in a Nash market equilibrium, the firm I is under-
taking at least one project of type t •Then,the Increment in its
probability of 'success' (that is, in its probability of capturing the
rent R )fromundertaking the marginal project of type t is:
s(m, 5m)— 5• Thisexpression is the same as the proba—
fi fi
bility that the marginal project is successful, and all other projects
i (that is, those in the set ) in, aswell as in the set in) are
fi
unsuccessful. An earlier definition, therefore, allows us to restate
14 the above incremental probability as
i f i f
(18) r (in) = s(m ) in) — s(m in) t—t fi fi
Consequently, the increment in the profit of firm i from undertaking the
marginal project of type t is: krt(m_t) — •Itfollows then that a
market portfolio a is sustainable only if the breakeven condition
(19) Rr(m_)
— et•_014
is satisfied for all firms 'which undertake one or more projects of type
t •Themain point to note here is that the breakeven condition for the
sustainability of a market portfolio, (19), is the same as the breakeven
condition for the quasi—efficient portfolIo. (15). Analogous derivations
show that the other two optimality conditions for the quasi—efficient
portfolio. (16) and (17). also characterize the sustainability of a market
portfolio. This is intuitive because, under Bertrand competition, a firm's
decision to undertake or not to undertake a marginal project (of any type)
turns out to be based on the same considerations which are relevant in
determining the quasi—efficient portfolio.
The above characteriiation of the market portfolio leads to the
following result: If the quasi—efficient portfolio is feasible in the
market, then it is sustainable as a market portfolio. (What we mean here
by feasibility is that there is at least one way to spread the quasi—
efficient portfolio among the firms in the market, without violating the
firm's constraints; that is rn￿ M .)Thisis because if firms' port-
folios are such that the market portfolio is the same as the quasi—
efficient portfolio, then no firm has an incentive to changeits
portfolio.
-Considernow two economies which differ in the number of firms as 'well
as in the constraints faced by different firms, but the quasi—efficient
portfolio is feasible in both of them. A corollary of the above result is
that the quasi—efficient portfolio is sustainable in both economies. Thus:
Among the equilibria in the two different economies are at least two (one
in each economy) which entail the same market portfolio of research pro-
jects, provided the quasi—efficient portfolio is feasible •in both
economies.is
Wewould, of course, have liked to prove a stronger invariance result:
that the set of equilibria in two different economies are .identical. But
this does not appear to be the case. There may be market equilibria in
which the constraints faced by one or more firms are strIctly binding on
the portfolios they have chosen. As a consequence, if one firm undertakes
a project at an inefficient effort level, then it may lead some other
firms to undertake projects which are also at inefficient effort levels.
This is because, as pointed out earlier, the marginal gains to a firm are
influenced by what is undertaken in the market.
The stronger result does, however, hold if the relevant difference
among firms is only due to the access they have to different technologies.
To see this, suppose different types of firms have access to different
subsets of the economy—wide set of technologies, but the choices of firms
(in an equilibrium) ire not constrained due to any other reason. That is,
no firm undertakes all of the projects (of a technology to which it has
access) that it could. We refer to such equilibria as 'interior equilib-
ria.' Once again, the sustainability conditions for a market portfolio
(corresponding to an interior equilibrium) are the same as the optimality
conditions for the quasi—efficient portfolio (where the latter portfolio
maximizes Rr(M) —Msubject to the economy—wide set of technologies).
Thus: All interior equilibria in a market economy entail a market port-
folio which is the same as the quasi—efficient portfolio. Next, consider
two different market economies ( A and A') which have the saie types
of firms (though the number of firma of different types are different).
It follows from the la3t result that: The market portfolio is identical
for all interior equilibria in the two econouiies.1516
4. Conclusions
The relationship between the market structure and the nature of market
R+D, and that between the private and social marginal returns from innova-
tive activity are, in general, complicated. This paper establishes an
important invariance result in the central case of Bertrand competition:
the market R+D (that is, the number of research projects undertaken as
well as the intensities of individual projects) is invariant to the number
of firms in the industry. We also show that though the market expenditure
on R+D is efficiently spent (in the sense that the market portfolio of
research projects is socially optimal, given the market expenditure), the
market expenditure is smeller than what is socially desirable.
In a simplified version of our model, we have established additional
results. We show, for instance, that the intensity of an R+D project in
the market is socially optimal (in particular, the intensity does not
depend on the magnitude of rent that a firm gains from successful innova-
tion), but the market undertakes a smaller number of projects than is
socially optimal. We have also hinted at some policy implications: for
example, the desirability of increasing the number of firms (which yields
larger gains to consumers, smaller gains to firms, and larger social
welfare gains).
An important ingredient behind a theory of the firm which our analysis
has left out is the economies and diseconomies of scope; that is, there
may be important spillover effects among the research projects undertaken
by a firm. Also, the relationships we have established here between
social and private returns will not in general obtain under other forms of
competition (for example, Cournot). Our analysis suggests, further, the17
need to compare the outcomes of policies aimed at encouraging price
competition versus other forms of competition (for example, quantity
competition). The determinants of and moans by which the government may
affect a choice in the modes of competition is, however, a question beyond
the scope of this paper.18
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1. See Barzel (1968), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980), Kamian and Swartz
(1982), Loury(1979),and Stiglitz (forthcoming), among others.
2. See footnote 1.
3. See below for precise definitions of quasi—efficiency and of an
interior equilibrium.
4. Here we abstract from issues concerning the timing and the scale of
innovations; that is, by spending more resources, one canalterthe
date of innovatipn or the magnitude of rent. But the analysis can be
readily modified to incorporate these aspects.
5. Subscripts e and k denote partial derivatives with respect to
these variables.
6. As is well known, there may not always exist a symmetric interior Nash
equilibrium, because of the non—concavity of the relevant functions.
Also, we are assuming at present that there are no binding constraint
(such as on credit) which might prevent a firm from undertaking the
desired set of projects. A more general framework is considered
later.
7. For simplicity, we are treating k as a continuous variable. If k
is treated as an integer, then the expression analogous to (4) is:
R(i —p)fl1p(e +a)R(1—p)flp,withat least one strict
inequality. Thisdoesnot affect the invariance result derived below.19
8. Thesignof the right hand side of (9) is obtained as follows. q(k)
La easily seen to be strictly concave in k •Thusq(k) —q(k=0)<
O)k .Using(1), then, kln(1 —p)+q(k)< 0 ,Thus,(9)
is negative.
9. The simplest case is that of a cost reducing innovation for a pro-
duct. Suppose the innovation reduces the (fixed) unit cost of the
product from c0 to c2 ,wherec is the current (competitive)
price. If only one firm innovates then it sets a monopoly price
Cl,where
c0c1 > c2 •Therent to this firmis
R(a1 —c2)D(c1)where D is the aggregate demand function. If
more than one firminnovatesthen, due to Bertrand competition, the
new competitiveprice is c2 .Obviously,then, s2 —S1> 0 .Also,
unless the demand is entirely insensitive to the price, the standard
consumer surplus arguments show that S2 —
S1> R .
10.See footnote 9.
11. These conclusions, naturally, do not extend to distortivo instruments
such as investment tax credits. It should also be pointed out that
certain instruments of policy may not be feasible due to informational
problems. For example, it may be difficult to monitor the numberof
projects widertaken by a firm.
12.As in some earlier literature (Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980). for
example], the present treatment of social optimm assumes that the
revenue required to finance the R+Dcanberaised in a non—distortive
manner. If only distortive instruments (such as commodity taxes) are
available for raising revenue then, under some circumstances, the 'wel—20
fare consequence of the market allocation may not be significantly
different from that of the social optimum. See Stiglitz (forthcoming).
13. A firmmightbe facing some other type of constraints; for instance,
on the total effort that it can spend (credit constraint) or on the
typesoftechnologies available to it. These different formulations,
however, do not affect our results.
14. Note, once again, that (18) does not depend on whether the outcomes of
projects within or across portfolios m and5 m are correlated
fi
or independent.
15. If there is a multiplicity of quasi—efficient portfolios then the last
two results are modified as follows: (i) Every interior equilibrium
in a market economy entails a portfolio which is the same as a quasi—
efficient portfolio, and (ii) Consider an interior equilibrium in
economy A •Ifthe corresponding market portfolio is feasible in
economy A' ,thenit is sustainable in economy A'21
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